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This paper contains an analysis of the role of international reserves
under a regime of pegged exchange rates and under a regime of managed floating.
It presents evidence on the stability of the demand for reserves during the
periods 1963—72 and 1973—75. It is shown that the demand for reserves by
developed countries differs from that of less—developed countries and that
the system underwent a structural change by the end of 1972. In view of the
drasticchange in the international monetary system, the extent of the structural
changehas not been as large as might have been expected, thus leading to
the observation that economic behavior seems to be more stable than legal
arrangements. From the policy perspective it follows that the problems
concerning the role of the International Monetary Fund in this context are as
relevant at the present as they were in the past..
The paper concludes with a sketch of a stochastic framework for the
analysis of the optimal degree of managed floating. And its purpose is to
suggest an additional set of variables which might be incorporated intothe
specificationof the demand for international reserves. It is shown that the
optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility depends on the stochastic nature
ofthe shocks that the economy faces. The stochastic characteristics of the
shocks include a distinction between real and monetary shocks, domestic and
foreign shocks and depend on the covariances among the various shocks.
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One of the striking features characterizing the international monetary
system since the early 1970's has been the continued use of international reserves
even though, legally, the system has been characterized as a flexible exchange
rate regime.
In this paper I analyze the interrelationship between the determinants
and patterns of reserve holdings and the international monetary system. Section
II contains an empirical analysis of the demand for international reserves.
In this context I analyze the differences in behavioral patterns of developed and
less—developed countries. Section III deals with the empirical question of the
timing at which the system moved from pegged to floating rates. The interest
in this question stems from the belief that timing of changes in economic behavior
need not correspond to, or be associated with, the timing of changes In legal
commitments. One of the conclusions emerging from the analysis is that the
extent of the change in economic behavior (as far as the holdings of international
reserves is concerned) has not been as large as one might have predicted. Countries
have preferred to move to a system of managed floating that is intermediate
between the extremes of fixed rates and of clean float. Section IV provides a
sketch of an analytical framework for the analysis of a managed float regime.
Some concluding remarks and suggested extensions are contained in Section V.
11.1 The Determinants of the Demand
for International Reserves
Earlier studies of the demand for reserves considered the variability
of international receipts and payments as an important argument in the demand
function (e.g., Kenen and Yudin, 1965; dower and Lipsey, 1968; Archibald
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and Richmond, 1971). In addition, it has been suggested that the demand
function also depends on the propensity to import (e.g., Heller, 1966; Kelly,
1970; Clark, l970a;Flanders, 1971; Frenkel, l974a, 1974b, 1978; Hipple, 1974;
lyoha,1976). These and other studies have recently been surveyed by Grubel
(1971), Williamson (1973), Claassen (1974) and Cohen (1975).
The choice of a variability measure as an argument in the demand
functionstems directly from the role of international reserves in serving
as a buffer stock accomodating fluctuations in external transactions.
Consequently,ithasgenerally been expected that the demand for reserves
is positively associated with the extent of these fluctuations.
Therationale for the use of the propensity to import as an argu-
ment is more involved. It stems from an application of the Keynesian
priceless model of the foreign trade multiplier. According to that model,
an external disequilibrium that is induced by a decline in export earnings,
could be corrected by a decline in output proportional to the multiplier.
The cost of output adjustment could be saved if the monetary authorities
are able to run down their stock of international reserves thereby enabling
them to finance the external deficit. Since the foreign trade multiplier
(and thus the required output dampening in the absence of reserves) is
inversely related to the marginal propensity to import, the popular approach
argues that the cost of not having reserves, and hencethe demand for reserves,
is inversely related to the marginal propensity to import (see references
op cit.).In the absence of data on the marginal propensity to import,
earlier empirical studies have replaced it by the ratio of imports to income,
i.e., by the average propensity (typically referred to as the degreeof
"openness" of the economy). The coefficient of the average propensity to
import frequently appeared with the "wrong" (positive) signwhen used to
estimate the demand for reserves.3
Using an adjustment mechanism which emphasizes the role of relative
prices, price level and demand for money, it was previously shown (Frenkel,
l974a) that under certain assumptions, the demand for reserves was expected
to be associated positively with the average propensity to import. This
association was shown to be consistent with data for the period 1963—1967
for both Developed and Less—Developed Countries (Frenkel, l974b). A simplified
derivation of the association between reserve holdings and the propensity
to import is presented in Appendix A.It is shown that the relationship
between these two variables is, in general, not a clear cut, although, under
some assumptions this relationship is expected to be positive.
In what follows I present cross—sectional estimates of the demand
for international reserves where, in addition to the above mentioned variables,
I have also included a scaling variable as one of the determinants of the
demand.1
11.2 Cross—Sectional Estimates of the
Demand for International Reserves
The empirical analysis includes data from 22 Developed Countries
and 32 Less—Developed Countries (LDC's) and covers the period 1963—75.
Appendix B contains the list of countries and definitions of variables used
additional variable which in principle should have been included
in the list of the determinants of reserve holdings is the opportunity cost
of holding reserves. In practice, a large fraction of international reserves
is held in the form of short term interest—bearing assets and thus, the
opportunity cost is the difference between the alternative yield and the rate
of return on reserves. Previous studies faced serious difficulties in estimat-
ing this cost. Clark (1970a) decided to exclude this variable from his estima-
tion. Heller (1966) assumed that the cost was the same for all countries (5
percent). Kenen and Yudin (1965) used income per capita as a proxy, and found
that it had the "wrong" sign and was not significant. Kelly (1970) used in
addition to per capita income, the value of foreign assets and liabilities as
proxies, but found that in all cases the latter appeared with the "wrong" sign
while in some cases the former had the "wrong" sign. Courchene and Youssef
(1967) used the long—term interest rate as a proxy, and found that in five out
of nine cases its coefficient was not significantly negative. All these
attempts taken together, provided the rationale for not including this variable
in the estimating equations.4
inthe analysis. The classification of countriesas Developed and Less—
Developed is based on that of the IMF. The choice of countriesand the
period of analysis was determined by the availability ofcontinuous series of dat
As indicated above, the demand function was assumedto depend on three
variables: (i) a measure of variability of internatidna].receipts and
payments denoted by a; the value of a for each year was estimatedby computing
thestandard deviation over the previous 15 years of thetrend—adjusted annual
changes of the level of reserves;3 (ii)ascaling variable measuring the size
ofinternational transactions represnted by the level ofGNP, Y; in the few
cases where this was not available, it was replaced by Gross DomesticProducts,
GDP, and (iii) the average propensity to import, mIM/Y, where IM denotes
imports.
The functional form of the demand function was assumed to be:
(1)
where u denotes an error term.
Tables 1 and 2 present for each year the cross—sectional ordinary—least—
squaresestimates of the demand for reserves by developed and less—developed
countries. In all cases the coefficients have the expected positive sign and in
most cases these coefficients are statistically significant at the 95percent
confidencelevel.
2Fromthe list of countries for which data were available, two
countries——Canada and the United States——were excluded from the analysis.
Canada was excluded since it had a flexible exchange rate system during
most of the period for which the variability measure was calculated. Since
the discussion focuses on the behavior of countries as demanders of reserves,
the exclusion of the United States as the main supplier seems justified.
This relates to one of the limitations of the present approachof estimating
(tictpn%4nJ (rt-v.shy WMn$ of asingle regression equation. To the
best of my knowledge, the potential difficulty of an identification problem
is shared by all previous empirical studies of the demand for reserves.
limitation of this measure is that actual changes in reserves
need not provide an exact measure of the disturbance, since countries may
use other policies. Kenen and Yudin (1965) and Heller (1966) who have used
similar measures, have assumed that its estimates are not materially affected
by national policies.TABLE 1
ESTIMATED EQUATION: Zn R ao+ a1£n a +a2 £nY + a3 Zn m+ p
DEVELOPEDCOUNTRIES, N —22
(standard errors in parentheses)














































































































































ESTIM&TEDEQUATION: Ln R + Zn a + a2 thY +a3 £n Ut+j
LESS—DEVELOPEDCOUNTRIES, N 22
(standard errors in parentheses)
Year Constant Zn a thY Zn m R2 s.e.
1963 —366 .285 .825 .985 .78 .602
(.867) (.170) (.209) (.253)
1964 —.767 .249 .830 .990 .77 .599
(.870) (.175). (.209) (.251)
1965 —.715 .228 .851 .998 .80 .532
(.764) (.147) (.176) (.214)
1966 —.335 .279 .722 .775 .70 .661
(.970) (.177) (.215) (.257)
1967 —.679 .440 .654 .614 .66 .797
(1.107) (.212) (.259) (.311)
1968 —.839 .341 .749 .754 .69 .742
(1.072) (.195) (.232) (.278)
1969 —1.983 .210 .973 .905 .77 .666
(1.045) (.200) (.235) (.270)
1970 —2.265 .244 .957 .767 .75 .726
(1.165) (.216) (.256) (.288)
1971 —2.165 .159 1.050 1.069 .76 .697
(1.160) (.228) (.261) (.289)
1972 —1.923 .230 .987 .938 .83 .586
(.913) (.182) (.201) (.219)
1973 —.677 .565 .621 .530 .87 .530
(.837) (.166) (.176) (.171)
1974 —.091 .701 .413 .246 .79 .681
(1.103) (.211) (.222) (.225)
1975 —.512 .556 .537 .416 .80 .655
(.921) (.137) (.156) (.167)5
Insummary it should be noted that the overall I it of the regressions
reported in Tables I. and 2 (as measured by the coefficients of determination
R2) is very satisfactory. This point is noteworthy since these results
pertain to cross—sectional estimates. Of special interest is the good fit
of the cross—sectional regressions for the last few years reported in Tables
1 and 2. During the latter years of the sample period, the international
monetary system moved towards a greaterflexibi1ity of exchange rates. This
move was expected to result in different as well as in less stable estimates
of the parameters of the demand for reserves. Since, as will be shown below,
the cross—sectional estimates seem to have remained stable (at least during
the periods 1963—72 and 1973—75), more efficient estimates may be obtained
by ppoling the time series with cross sections.
11.3 Pooled Time—Series and Cross—Sections:
Pegged Versus Floating Exchange Rates
In order to examine the effect of the move to a regime
of flexible exchange rates, I have divided the sample into two periods: the
pegged exchange rate period (1963—72) and the flexible exchange rate period
(1973—75). In Section III I provide a formal justification for this division.
To the extent that the coefficients of the cross—sectional equations
remained stable within each of the periods 1963—72 and l97375, one may
obtainmore efficient estimates by pooling the time—series with the cross—
sections. Table 3 contains the ordinary—least—squares estimates of the pooled
regressionfor both periods. Inall cases the coefficients are positive
and significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
Iturn now to a comparison of the regression coefficients between
Developed and Less—Developed countries during the two periods. The first
methodused for this comparison was the dummy variables method as outlined by
Cujarti(1970). According to this method, each and everycoefficient wasTABLE 3
ESTIMATED EQUATION: Zn R -a0
+ a1 Zn a + a2 Zn Y+a3 Zn in+ji
POOLEDTI)IE SERIES—CROSS SECTION
(standard errors in parentheses)














































allowedto differ between developed and less—developed countries by including
dummy variables pertaining to data for developed countries. The estimated
coefficients of the dummy variables are reported in Table 4 where it is seen
that for the first period the coefficients of the constant term and the variability
measureare significantly higher for developed countries while the coefficients
ofIncome are lower. For the latter period, however, the two groups differ signif i—
cantlyonly in their constant term. These estimates reveala larger degree of
economies of scale in the demand for reserves (asmeasured by the income
elasticity) in Developed Countries than in LDC's. It is alsoapparent that
the demand for reserves by LDC'sisless sensitive to the variabilitymeasure
than the demand by Developed countries. The differencesin the iXiCOIqe elas-
ticitiesmayreflect differences in the character of the financialsystems. The
financialsystem £nDevelopedcountries is more sophisticated than itscounter-
part inLDC's and thus entailing larger possibilities foreconomies of scale
in reserve management. Inaddition, Developed countries have a larger access
to world capital markets andgreaterfacilities for swap agreements. The higher
sensitivity of Developed countries to the variability measuremayreflectlarger
reluctance to cope with unexpected shocks byimposing trade controls andTABLE 4
TESTSFOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND
LESS—DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(standarderrors in parentheses)
y are EstimatedDummiesfor DevelopedCountries F—statistic



















Note: The estimated dummies measure the differential values oftheconstant andtheslope coefficients for developed countries from thecorresponding estimatet for LDC's.The F—statistics for the Chow—test correspond to the nullhypothesis
that the regression coefficients are the same fordeveloped and less—developed
countries. The relevant degrees of freedom for the twoperiods are F(4, 540)
and F(4, 162), respectively. The null hypothesis isrejected since the values
of the F—statistics exceed the critical values atconventional cionfidence levels.7
restrictions.4 These differences have diminished significantly with the
move towards greater flexibility of exchange rates.
The dummy variables method focuses on comparisons between individual
coefficients. The second method that was employed in the comparison between
Developed and Less—Developed countries was that of the Chow—test following
the procedure described by Fisher (1970). The results of this test are
also reported in Table 4 where the F—statistics correspond to the null—hypothesis
that the OLS regressions in Table 4 do not differ from each other. The null
hypothesis is rejected since the values of the F—statistics exceed the critical
values at the 95 percent confidence level. Thus, also the Chow—test leads to
the conclusion thqt Developed andLess—Developedcountries reveal different
behaviorconcerning the holdings of international reserves.It is of interest
toexplore ingreater detail the pattern of the move to the floating rates regime,
asare implied by the characteristics of reserve holdings.
III. When Did the System Move from
Pegged to Floating Rates?
The analysis in the previous sections made a distinction between
the periods 1963—12 and 1973—75. The presumption was that the evolution
of the international monetary system from pegged exchange rates to floating
exchange rates might have resulted in a structuralchange in the demand for
internationalreserves. In the present section I examine formally the timing
and extent of the structural change following the method proposed by Quandt
(1958, 1960)
4For further elaboration of these and otherinterpretations see
Frenkel (1974b).
5Forthis and other methods of analyzing switching regressions see
Goldfe].dandQuandt(1976, Chs. 1, 4).8
Consider a situation In which a structural change occurred at year t*
withln.the period 1,... ,T and assume that the demand for reserves corresponding
to the two regimes (before and after t*) can be characterized by two distinct
regression equations like (2) —(3)
(2) a
x'.B1+ u1, t <t*
(3) y x' S + u , t>t
inin 2 2nt
where u and u are the error terms that are assumed to be distributed as
flit 2nt
N(O, o) and N(O, a), B• and 82 are the vectors of the regression coefficients
corresponding to the two regimes, and where ii1,...,N denote the countries
(for the Developed countries N22 and for the LDC's N =32).The analysis of
the timing of the structural change amounts to searching for the value of t*.
Quandt's method of estimating t*involvesthe following: first, a maximization
of the likelihood function (4) conditional on t*:
(4) L(yt*)(f)NT/2_Nt*a2_N(T_t*) exp -_1r -x'Bi)2
—





(where N denotes the number of countries and T denotes the number of years), and
second, determination of the breakpoint t as the value which yields the highest
maximum likelihood L(yt*). The application of this procedure to determining
the breakpoint in the demand for reserves, yields 1973 and 1972 as the estimates
for t*forDeveloped and Less—Developed countries, respectively. -9
Based on these results, 1972 is used as the estimate of
the break point for both the Developed and the Less Developed Countriee,,.
implying that the two subperiods are 1963—72 and 1973—75.
This choice is based on the fact that while for LDC's 1972 seems to be an
unambiguous estimate for the date of the structural change, the case for
Developed Countries is less clear cut; it is therefore assumed that, by
analogy with the LDC's, the break point for Developed Countries also
occurred in 1972. The validity of this assumption can be tested by applying
the likelihood—ratio test to the null hypothesis that no switch took place
between 1972 and 1973. The likelihood ratio statistic is
4)= Nt*N(T_t*)/ANT
where T is the estimated standard deviation of the residuals from thesingle
regression estimated over the entire period 1963—75.
According to the null hypothesis, —2 Lnis distributed The
null hypothesis is rejected for both groups of countries. For the LDC's the
value of —2 Lu 4)is16.4 while the corresponding value for Developed
Countries is 21.2, both exceeding 15.1——the critical value at the 99 percent
confidence level.6 The practical implication is that for the purpose of
estimation, data from the
period 1963—72 should not be pooled with those from the period 1973—75 and
that the structural change occurred by the end of 1972.
In addition to the above tests one may also use a Chow—test to
test for the equality of the regression coefficients between the two periods.7
The resulting values of the F—statistics relevant for testing the null hypothesis
61t should be noted that the application of this method to the problem
at hand is not without conceptual difficulties since it requires differentiating
the likelihood function with respect to t*.
Itshould also be noted that the analysis assumes that the structural change
has taken place at a given point in time._ An alternative., approach would allow
for a gradual evolution, and would estimate regression equations with variable
coefficients. For references and discussion of the properties of the distribution
of —2 Ln $seeGoj,dfeld and Quandt (1976, Ch. 1).
71n implementing the Chow—test one pretends that t* was known a priori.
Goldfeld and Quandt (1976, Ch. 1) provide reference to evidence that the
Chow—test yields satisfactory results.10
are 4.97 for Developed Countries and 3.79 forLDC's——well above the critical
values at the 99 percent confidence level. Thus, the Chow—test as well leads
to the rejection of the null hypothesis. The overall inference is that the
system has changed by the end of 1972. It is thisconclusion which provides
therationale for the pattern of the intertemporal pooling that is employed
in Tables 3_4•8Itshould be noted that even though, as a statistical matter,
thesystem underwent a structural change, the extent of the change has not been 1.
enough to make obsolete parameter estimates that are based on the period 1963—72.
In fact, forecasting reserve holdings during the period 1973—75 based on paramete
estimates from 1963—72, yield extremely good predictions (for details see
Frenkel, 1978).
The interpretation of the relative stability of the patterns of reserve
holdings is quite obvious: during the pegged rate regime the rate was adjustabic
rather than fixed and during the so—called floating rate regime the rate has beer
managed rather than free. Economic behavior seems to be more stable than legal
arrangements. Central banks have revealed that their choice is for neither of
the extreme exchange rate systems, but have rather, preferred to have the inter-
mediate system àf managed floating. Since managing the float requires internati.J
reserves, it seems relevant to analyze the determinants of the degree to which
countries will attempt to manage the float. In the following section I deal
with some analytical aspects of managed floating.
8The above discussion associated the structural change with the change
in the exchange rate regime; it could of cour8ereflect other (not necessarily
unrelated)phenomena which occurred in the early 1970's like the oil crisis
andthecommodity price boom.11
IV. A Sketch of a Framework for the Analysis
of Managed Float9
In this section 1 provide a sketch of an analytical framework for
the analysis of the economics of managed floating. The analysis will highlight
some variables which should be included as determinants of the demand for
reserves under a regime of managed float.
-
Earlierdiscussions oE the optimal exchange rate regime centered
around comparisons between fixed and flexible exchangà rate systems. More
recent explorations——originating with Mundell's contributions in the early
l960's——have shifted to the determination of optimal currency areas within
which exchange rates are fixed and between which exchange ares are flexible.
The following analysis of the optimal managed float recognizes that the
spectrum of possibilities is broader and that the rate of exchange between
any pair of currencies need not be entirely fixed or flexible but rather
it might be some optimal mix of the two extremes. In what follows I will
sketch a simple analytical framework that highlights some of the determinants
of the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility. The analysis will emphasize
the role of the stochastic structure of the various shocks which affect the
economy, and its purpose is to suggest and additional set of variables which
might be incorporated into the specification of the demand for international
reserves under a regime of managed float.
Consider a small economy that is subject to two types of repetitive
and serially uncorrelated shocks. These shocks, which are specified below
in a manner similar to that of Fischer (1977), are referred to as real and
monetary shocks.
amindebtedto Michael Bazdarich for research assistance and
suggestions concerning the material in this section. The material in this
section draws on Frenkel (19761,).
- -12
ènote the supply of output by Yandlet
t
(5) =ye';p -N(—a2/2,a2)
where p is a stochastic shock (the "real" shock) with a constant variance q2.
Ii
Themean of the distribution of the real shock is chosen to be —a2/2 so
p
as to assure that the expected value of output equals y (permanent income).
The second shock arises from the monetary sector. Let the demand
for nominal cash balances L be
(6) L =LcP eC; eN(—cx2/2, 2a) t tt £
wherek denotes the desired money—income ratio,. P denotes the domestic
price level and Cdenotesthe stochastic shock to the demand for money
(the "monetary" shock).
The domestic price level is linked to the foreign price through
the purchaiing power parity relationship. Thus
(7) P =SP*
ttt
whereP denotes the foreign price level and St denotes the exchange rate
(the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). To simplify
the analysis it is assumed that foreign prices are fixed, (and thus it
will be denoted henceforth as p*), that purchasing power parity holds
deterministically and that p and e are independent)°
more elaborate analysis would allow for disturbances which
originate from the foreign sector and which are allowed to be correlated
with domestic shocks. Another
extension would allow for possible short run deviations from purchasing
power parity in which case, in the short run changes in the exchangerate
induce changes in relative prices. For a rationale for managed float
that is based on this phenomenon see Mussa (1976); for recent empirical
evidence on the short run relationship between exchange rates and relative
prices see Dornbusch and Krugman (1977). In a recent analysisof the
optimal foreign exchange intervention Boyer (1976) extends and applies
Poole's framework (1970) to the problem at hand. Boyer assumes that
real income is fixed and that the objective function is to minimizevaria-
bility of prices.13
Assumethatthe flow demand for money AMd corresponds to a stock
adjustmentprocesssuch that
(8)
where denotes the money stock at the beginning of the period.
Using equations (5) and (7 )wemay express the demand for money
(6) as
(9 ) kSP*yet
When the exchange rate is flexible, it will adjust so as to eliminate
anystockdisequilibrium in the money market, and thus ensuring that
Lt — 0.Using (9 )itfollows that when the exchange rate is flexible,
(10) kSP*yeM —= 0.
Theequilibrium exchange rate can be written as
(LI)
St(i/kP*y)eh1+
and the percentage change thereof is
(12) inS—in s1 tIt_1P*Y)
—(v÷ c).
The other extreme system is the fixed exchange rate system for
which
(13) La S —inS 0.
t t—1
Using (12) and(13)we maydefinean index 'r such that 0 cyc 1:
(14) y (Zn —inS1)/[in (i/kS11P*y) -(p÷c)].'4
The coefficient y characterizes the whole spectrum of exchange rate regimes.
When y0, the system is that of a fixed exchange rate, and when y1
the system is that of a freely flexible exchange rate. An intermediate
value of y indicates art intermediate degree of exchange rate flexibility.
We will refer to the coefficient xasthe coefficient of managed float, or
the intervention index. From the policy perspective, the basic question is
to determine the optimal value of y, and thus to determine the optimal degree
of exchange rate flexibility.
In principle, if shocks were identifiable, the optimal policy would
be to allow the exchange rate to correct monetary disturbances but not real
disturbances.11 We will assume, however, that information is incomplete and
that during a given period only the joint outcome of the shocks p +is
known but not the separate values of p and c. It is this lack of complete
information which necessitates a second—best policy of managed float)-2
Assume that the objective is to minimize the losses due to imperfect
information and that the policymaker wishes to minimize the quadratic
loss function H:
(15) Minimize H =E[c
—E(Yt)]2
where c denotes the rate of consumption which, from the budget constraint,




For an analysis of this proposition see Fischer (1977).
'2The assumption of the lack of complete information has been used
by Gray (1976) to analyze partial wage indexation.15
The previous relationships imply that
(17) [c —E(Yt)] y(e1' —1)—aky[e6—(Mt1kSt_1P*y)'e],
and using (17) in (15) yields the loss function which is to be minimized
with respect to the intervention index y.
The above analysis has not specified the value of themoney stock
at the beginning of the period. It is assumed, following Fischer (1977),
that at the beginning of each period the monetary authority changes the
money supply so as to compensate for past disturbances according to
(18) =kS_P*y.
Substituting (18) in GL7) and minimizing the loss function with respect
to y yield the following implications concerning the choice of the optimal
degree of exchange rate flexibility:
Ci)Ingeneral, the optimal value of y will be within the range
(0, 1), so that the optimal exchange rate regime will correspond to neither
of the extremes of a completely fixed or of a completely flexible rate
regime.
(ii) The intermediate solution is more likely the higher is k——the
propensity to save out of transitory income.
(iii) When the only shocks to the system are real (a 0), the
optimal solution is that of fixed rates Ci =0);and conversely, when the
only source of shocks is monetary (c =0),the optimal solution is that
of freely floating rates Ci= 1).
(iv) The higher the variance of the monetary shock, the larger will
be the optimal value ofwhile the higher is the variance of the real shock
the lower will be the optimal value of y. That Is,_1Ugh variance of real16
shocks,ceteris paribus, tends to raise the desirability of greater fixity of
exchange rates andconversleyfor high variance of monetary shocks.
Table 5 contains the results of illustrative computations of the
optimal degree of the intervention index y for alternative values of ak——the
propensity to save out of transitory income——and for alternative assumptions
concerning the magnitudes of the various shocks. These results illustrate
the above propositions.
The analysis in this section provides a simple framework for
determining the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility. It highlights
the unique role of the stochastic structure of the economy and suggests,
therefore, that the magnitude of and the relationship between these variables
are among the determinants of the demand for reserves and should be incorporated
TABLE5
OPTIMALFW4AGED FLOAT FOR ALTERNATIVE VALUES OF REAL AND
MONETARYDISTURBANCES ANDSAVINGPROPENSITIES
Noc ak =.5
.01 .03 .05 .07 .09
ak =3.
.05 .07 .09 .01.03
.01 .0 .80 .92 .96 .98 .50 .90.96 .98 .99
.03 .0 .47 .69 .80 .87 .10 .50 .74 .85 .90
.05 .0 .0 .0 .33. .53 .04 .27 .50 .67 .77
.07 .0.0.0.0 .25 .02.16.34.50.63
.09 .0.0.0.0.0 .01.10.24.38.51
intothe analysis of the demand for international reservesunder a regime
of managed float.
As a general comment on the analysis in thissection it should be
noted that monetary policy andforeignexchange intervention are treated17
as close substitutes. In fact, as a first approximation, these two policies
are non—distinguishable. It is believed that this feature of the model is
much closer to reality than would be the other extreme in which monetary
policy andforeignexchange policies are viewed as two independent policy
instruments.
The special role of the exchange rate should also be noted. In
the •above framework the exchange rate (and thereby the price level) is
determined by considerations of asset market equilibrium. This character-
istic is in accord with the recent developments of the asset market
approach to the analysis of exchange ratesJ3 An important limitation of
the model is the absence of an explicit incorporation of an integrated
world capital market which would relfect itself in the capital account of
the balance of payments.
Finally, it should be noted that the present specification of the
nature of the shocks is somewhat biased in favor of government intervention
since the shocks have been presumed to originate from the instability of
the private sector rather than from the actions of government policies.
Furthermore, the concept of the optimal managed float and thereby the derived
demand for international reserves were developed as a plicy prescription for
the monetary authorities. This was motivated by realism and could be
rationalized in terms of the assumption that the monetary authorities possess
superior information concerning its own actions as well as concerning the
official holdings of international reserves. In principle, however, much
of the optimal mix could also be performed by the private sector.
13See for example Dornbusch (1976), Frenkel (l976a), Kouri (1976),
Nussa (1976), Bilson (1978) and Frenkel and Johnson (1978).18
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper contained an analysis of the role of international reserves
under a regime of pegged exchange rates and under a regime of managed float.
It presented evidence on the stability of the demand for reserves during the
periods 1963—72 and 1973—75. It was shown that the demand for reserves by
developedcountries differs from that of less—developed countries and that the
systemunderwent a structural change by the end of 1972. Inview of the drastic
changesin the international monetary system, the extent of the structural
change(in particular with reference to the behavior of developed countries) has
not been as large as one might have expected.14 This finding led to the obser-
vation thateconomic behavior seems to be more stable than legal arrangements.
The evidence show that countries have continued to hold and use international
reserves. Likewise, countries have chosen to manage their exchange rates rather
than let it float freely. From the policy perspective, it follows that the
problems concerning theprovision of international reserves andthe discussions
concerningthe role of the IMFinthis contextare as relevant at the present
asthey were in the past.'5 The paper concluded with a sketch of a stochastic
frameworkfor the analysis of the optimal degree of managed floating.
The analysis in this paper would benefit from several extensions.
First, it was assumed that, during the sample period, countries were "on"
theirlong—run demand functions. An extension would allow for a distinction
between short—run and long—run demand functions and would examine the determ-
inants of the speed of adjustment along the lines of Clark (l970b). Second,
14Foranalyses of the effects of the move to floating exchange rates on
the demand for and the optimal provision of international reserves see Grubel
(1976), Makin (1974) and Williamson (1976). For evidence on reserve use during
thetwo regimes see Suss (1976) andfora comparison of the estimated coefficients
in the Canadian case see Saidi andEarro (1977).
l5 this issue see, however, Eaberler (1976).19
anexamination of the residuals from the estimated equations revelas the
existence of persistent negative residuals for some countries (e.g., U.K.and
NewZealand) and positive residuals for other (e.g., Switzerland). Anextension
would refine the grouping of countries by allowing forcountry—specificfactors.
In this connection it would be of interest to test the hypothesis thatcountries
behave so as to trade—off large stocks of reserves for high speeds ofadjustment;
some preliminary results in Bilson and Frenkel (1978) are consistent with this
hypothesis.
Third, the specification of the demand for reserves was assumed to
remain unchanged as between the two exchange rate regimes. In principle,
however, the specification of the demand for reserves during a regime of managed
float should be derived from the analysis of the determinants of countries'
decisions concerning the degree of optimal foreign exchange intervention (i.e.,
the optimal managed float). In Section XV it was shown that the optimal
degree of managed float depends on the details of the stochastic structure of the
various shocks which affect the economy. It suggests, therefore, that these
stochastic characteristics should be incorporated into the specification of
the demand for reserves under a regime of managed float!6
Finally, the analytical framework underlying the literature on the
demand for international reserves needs to be tied up with the framework
underlying the literature on the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
The monetary approach to the balance of payments emphasizes the considerations
of monetary equilibrium and highlights the fact that when the monetary authori-
ties peg the rate of exchange, they lose control over the nominal monetary stock.
In many of the simplified versions of the monetary approach to the balance of
payments, credit policies are viewed as the exogenous variable which, along
with the path of the demand for money, determine (as a residual) the path of
the relationship between the stochastic structure of the economy
and the estimated coefficients see Lucas (1976).20
international reserves?7Inthis frameworklittle attention has been paid to
incorporating into the analysis the possibility that the monetary authorities
mayhave preferences concerning the composition of their assets?8 These
preferences are emphasized in the analytical framework underlying the demand
for international reserves. In that literature, however, little attention
has been paid to the conditions of monetary equilibrium. A useful extension
would combine these two strands of analysis. In such an extension, credit
policies would not be viewed as exogenous but rather, international reserves
and domestic credit would be determined jointly so as to satisfy simultaneously
equilibrium in the money market as well as equilibrium in the composition of
central banks' assets.
'7See for example the various studies in Frenkel and Johnson (1976).
For an exception which incorporates the monetary authorities' reaction
function into the analytical framework of the monetary approach to the balance
of payments see Ujiie (1978).21
APPENDIX A
Reserve Holdings and the Average
Propensity to Import
In this appendix I derive the relationship between long run holdings
of international reserves and the average propensity to import. It is shown
that in contrast with the implications of the simple foreign trade multiplier,
the relationship is not a clear cut one. Furthermore, it is shown that
accordingto a specific interpretation of the "small country assumption,'t
there existsa positive long run relationship between openness (the average
propensityto import) and reserve holdings.
Considerthe following simple two—goods model of a fully employed
economy. The economy produces and consumesthe quantities [X1, X2] and




whereP1 and P2 are the money pricesof the two goods. Denoting a percentage
change in a variable by a circumflex (e.g.,X =dX/X),and using the fact that
for small changes P1IX1 + P2dX2 =0(theenvelope theorem), one maywrite
thepercentage change in nominal income as:






In equation (A.2), O denotes the relative share in production of good
I (i =1,2). Let consumer price level (P) be a linear homogenous function
of the money prices of goods with constant elasticities that are equal to








In equation (A.3), 8• denotes the average propensity to consume good I
(i1, 2). The following analysis is confined to the long runwhenexpendi-
tures are equal to income.




using (A.2) —(A.3)in (A.4), the percentage change in real income is
(A.5) (8— 02)(Pl —
Equation(A.5) emphasizes the fact that a change in the terms of trade
(p1/i'2) raises real income if the relative share in productionof the good
whose relative price has risen exceeds its relative share in consumption.
In particular, since the second commodity is the imported good, 82 >2and23
thus when P1 —P2
>0real income rises. Using the above notations, the
average propensity to import is —
Thestock demand for nominal cash balances (H') is assumed to
depend on the price level and on real income. This demand function is
homogenous of degree one in all prices:
(A.6) Md =PL(y).
The long run holdings of international reserves by the monetary authorities
is assumed to be an increasing function of the central bank's assets. For
simplicity, it is assumed that in the long run the money supply is propor-
tional to the stock of reserves as it is when the money multiplier is fixed
and when the operations of the monetary authorities are confined to pegging
the exchange rate. By an appropriate choice of units, the proportionality
factor is set to equal unity. It should be noted, however, that the
following qualitative results do not depend on this simplification.
Atequilibrium the existing stock of cash balances (reserves) equals
thedesired stock:
(A.]) R =PL(y)
whereR denotes the stock of reserves.
The percentage change of {A.7) is
(A.8) R =P+ n(3L/By)yIL
where rj denotes the income elasticity of the demand for real cash balances.
Using (A.3) and (A.5) in (A.8) yields
(A.9) R= +S2P2 ÷n(S2 — 82)(P1
—24
Equation(A.9) expresses the proportional change in reserves as a function
of the proportional change in prices. The first two terms describe the
effects of the change in the price level due to changes in its components,
and the third term describes the effects of the change in real income due
to a change in relative prices.
As can be seen from (A.9), for any given price level (so that the
sum of the first two terms in (A.9) vanishes), the effect of a given change
in the terms of trade on reserve holdings increases with —2). On
these grounds alone one may expect to find a positive relationship between
reserves and the average propensity to import. In general, however, the
price level will also change and therefore, in addition to the value of the
parameters, the relationship depends on whether the changes are due to
variations in the price of exportables or in the price of importables. It
is in this sense that the effect of openness on reserve holdings is not a
clear cut one. However, if we adopt some variant of the "small country
assumption" and assume that the price of importables (P2) is given by the
rest of the world, then equation (A.9) can be written as:
(A.lO) R/P =1-2+ n(2 -62)
which describes the effects of a given change in price on the holdings of
19
international reserves.
The effects of the magnitude of the average propensity to import
on reserve holdings can be ascertained by differentiating (A.lO) with respect
to (B2 —62).
An increase in the average propensity to import could result
from either a decline in the production of importables and/or from an increase
19Clearly,this variant of the "small country assumption" does not
imply that the terms of trade are fixed since the price of exportables is
determinedendogenously.25












Equation (A.ll) states that for given consumption conditions the induced
changes in international reserves (due to a given change in export price)
are positively related to the average propensity to import, The smaller
the production of importables, the larger will be the resulting change and
thus the holdings of reserves.. Equation (A.12) states that for given
production conditions, the induced changes in international reserves are
also positively related to the average propensity to import if the income
elasticity of the demand for money does not fall short ofunity.2° Cross—
sectional differences in the average propensity to import reflect differences
in both production andconsumptionshares. Since empirical studies on the
demand for money suggest that, in general, 1 does not fall short of unity,
one can expect reserve holdings to depend positively on the average propensity
to import. Further, if the main differences among countries are in production
It was previously shown (Frenkel, l974a) that in this case the
positive association between reserve holdings and the average propensity
to import will be maintained as long as nexceedssome critical number which
is smaller than unity. The difference arises from the simplification adopted
in the present analysis: the present analysis takes the change in export
prices as being the exogenous disturbance while the previous analysis allowed
export prices to be endogenously determined while taking changes in foreign
demand as the exogenous factor. In the latter case, the average propensity
toimport will also determine (via the Narshall—Lerner condition) the effect
ofagiven changein foreign demand on the price of exportables.26
patterns rather than in consumption patterns (as in the Heckscher—Ohlin;
model of international trade), equation (A.ll) implies that the positive
association between reserves and the average propensity to import will
be maintained as long as the income elasticity of the demand for money is
positive. It should, however, be emphasized that the above conclusions
havebeen derived for a specific interpretation of the "small country
assumption" and for a specificassumption concerning the nature and origin
of disturbances. In general the relationship between reserve holdings and
theaverage propensity to import depends on the nature and origin of
disturbances and is not clear cut. Furthermore, the formulation. in this
appendix assumes that under a pegged exchange rate system, the operation
of the monetary authorities are confined to pegging the rate and thus
yielding a "passive" path of reserves along the lines described by the
monetaryapproach to the balance of payments. Consequently, the terms
usedwere "reserve holdings" rather than the "demand for reserves." An
extension would modify the assumption concerning theoperations of the
monetaryauthorities and would allow forcreditpolicies that are aimed
atachieving the desired stock of international reserves.27
APPENDIXB
List of Countries and Definitions
of Variables
1. List of Countriesa
Developed Countries Less—Developed Countries




France Costa Rica Burma




















aclassification based on the International MonetaryFund.28
2. Definitions of Variables
Alldatasources are from the IFS tape obtained from the International
Monetary Fund.
6
R —Internationalreserves are measured in end—of—period 10 U.s. dollars.
Reserves are defined as the sum of gold1 SDR's, foreign exchange and
reserve position at the Fund. When reserves are reported in local
currency, they were converted to U.S. dollars using the end—of—period
exchange rate.
IM —Importsare reported as cif in local currency units. These figures
were then converted to U.s. dollars using he period average exchange
rate. The figures used are measured in l0 U.S. dollars.
ON? —GNPand GOP are reported in local currency units. These figures were
converted to U.S. dollars usin the period average exchange rate.
The figures are measured in l0 U.S. dollars.
m —Theaverage propensity to import was defined as the ratioof imports
to ON?. When the latter was unavailable, GOP was used instead.
a —Thevariability measure. To calculate the value of 4foryear T
for a given country, the following regression was first run:
Rt= a+ t+uovert=T—l5,...,T—1, andthenusing the
estimated trend 8T' a2 was defined
= - Ri-
(exceptfor 1961 for which, due to lack of data, 4isbased on the
previous 14 observations). Thus, a2 is defined asthe variance
of the trend—adjusted changes in the stock of international reserves.
A plot of the time—series of reserves revealed that the assumption
of a linear trend seems more appropriate than that of an exponential
trend.29
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